Bargaining using formal models (Negociación en base a modelos formales) | 2018

Bargaining using formal models (Negociación en base a modelos formales) | 2018

Description

Political actors engaging in competition often behave strategically in their behavior, and in their efforts to bargain and negotiate with each other. To understand strategic behavior, this workshop introduces students to the basics of formal theory, with an emphasis on non-cooperative game theory. We will discuss the fundamental concepts of rational choice, cooperative games, and the Nash, subgame, sequential, and Bayesian solution concepts. Further, we will seek to understand how game theory applies to both theoretical and applied settings, with an emphasis on strategic negotiation. These bargaining settings will allow students to better understand key political situations, such as wars, strikes, or legislative deadlock.

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Required Background

This course assumes no advanced mathematical background, though some introduction to basic algebraic concepts and calculus will be beneficial. Students with no background should gain an introduction to formal mathematical models that can serve as a basis for future research and applied work. Students with more familiarity with formal models should gain an ability to refine their work, improve their familiarity with these models, and improve their use of game theoretic tools. The course will further emphasize better use of these tools and the application of these tools to applied settings.

Instructor  

Navin Bapat
Professor in Political Science and the Curriculum of Peace, War, and Defense
University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill
bapat@email.unc.edu
https://politicalscience.unc.edu/staff/navin-bapat/

 

Navin Bapat


Navin Bapat, B.A. (Michigan, 1998), M.A. (Rice, 2001), PhD (Rice, 2004) is currently a Professor in Political Science and the Curriculum of Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina – Chapel Hill. His research utilizes mathematical modeling to develop theoretical explanations of political conflicts, including issues related to terrorism, insurgency, and economic sanctions. He has published in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Politics, International Organization, International Studies Quarterly, the British Journal of Political Science, Public Choice, the Journal of Peace Research, International Interactions, and Conflict Management and Peace Science. His current work examines American foreign policy and transnational terrorism, the strategic logic of government responses to terrorist threats, and the strategic behavior of firms during economic sanctions.